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EXCHANGE

Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the
Fictions of Statutory Interpretation
Eben Moglent and Richard J. Pierce, Jr.ft
In InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State,1 Cass Sunstein grapples with two of the most difficult and important questions concerning governance of the modern administrative state.
First, what institution should have the dominant role in interpreting ambiguous ageficy-administered statutes? And second, how
should the institution perform that task? Sunstein rejects the Supreme Court's answer to the first question, characterizing its assignment of a dominant interpretive role to agencies in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council2 as "the fox
guarding the hen house."3 Sunstein prefers to charge judges with
the responsibility of resolving most interpretive disputes. In answer to the second question, he constructs a new canonical
t Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University.
tt Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia University. Michael Herz, Henry
Monaghan, Richard Revesz, and Peter Strauss provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
I Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405
(1989).
2 467 US 837 (1984). The Court allocated institutional responsibility for statutory interpretation using a two-step approach:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.
Idat 842-43.
3 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 446 (cited in note 1).
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roadmap to guide judges in performing this interpretive function.
Sunstein's goal is not merely to answer two of the most perplexing
questions in public law, however. His proposed interpretive
roadmap is designed simultaneously to solve the public policy puzzle that most vexes students of political science, political economics, and public law: How can government close the yawning gap
between the large and theoretically attainable benefits of agencyadministered statutory schemes and the modest benefits frequently combined with perverse effects that government intervention actually yields? Sunstein attributes this disappointing disparity to a series of political and regulatory pathologies identified in
the social science literature.' His proposed solutions to the
problems that plague the administrative state then coincide with
his proposed answers to the two public law questions he addresses:
Judges5 should interpret agency-administered statutes in ways that
counteract political and regulatory pathologies.
Thus, Sunstein premises his canons of statutory interpretation
on modern understandings of the fallibility of the political institutions comprising the administrative state: Congress and agencies.
The administrative state, according to Sunstein, often yields
suboptimal results because the political institutions depart too frequently from the liberal republican understanding of individual
and political freedom. If they adhered to this understanding, they
would resolve all policy disputes by applying the principles of deliberation, civic virtue, equality of political actors, universalism,
practical reason, and broadly guaranteed rights of participation.6
In Sunstein's vision of the administrative state, the judiciary bears
the herculean responsibility of rescuing society from majoritarian
and minoritarian factionalism and other pathologies that pervade
the political institutions. If judges identify policy decisions that
appear to be products of improper motivation or inadequate deliberation, it is their responsibility to amend those decisions in order
to create the kinds of policies that would have been created by
political institutions adhering consistently to liberal republican

- Id at 463, 466-68, 476.
' As Sunstein notes in his reply, Principles, not Fictions, 57 U Chi L Rev 1247, 1249
(1990), his canons are also aimed at the agencies; see also Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 504
(cited in note 1) ("The interpretive principles suggested here are intended for the President,
regulatory agencies, and Congress, as well as for the courts."). Sunstein's primary audience
seems to be the judiciary, however.
I Sunstein is extending the theme he introduced in Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
Yale L J 1539, 1541 (1988).
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principles.7 Sunstein's canons guide the judges through this
amendment process.
Sunstein begins his article by rejecting all prior systems of
statutory interpretation because they are indeterminate, incomplete, or based on fictions.' In Part I, we address the latter two
bases for rejecting traditional interpretive regimes. We accept Sunstein's assertion that traditional systems are incomplete and premised on fictions.9 We argue, however, that all methods of statutory interpretation, including Sunstein's proposed canonical
system, necessarily share these traits. Indeed, incompleteness is an
essential feature of any system of statutory construction. A "complete" system would be intractable.
Similarly, we accept Sunstein's characterization of traditional
regimes as premised on fictions, 10 but not the pejorative connota-

tion he attaches to that characterization. All interpretive systems
necessarily rest upon fictions. The real legislative history of any
statutory enactment is not retrievable. Even if it were, the story
would be so complex and ambiguous that it would be useless to
most audiences. Sunstein's failure to recognize the necessarily in7

Id at 1581-89.

8 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 412-51, 503-04 (cited in note 1).
' There are, of course, numerous competing theories of statutory interpretation. Sunstein describes, and criticizes, many traditional approaches grouped in four broad categories:
textualism, contextual approaches, legal process approaches, and use of extratextual norms.
Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 415-51 (cited in note 1).
In this article, we attempt neither to engage in systematic evaluation and comparison of
the many competing theories nor to construct our own theory of statutory interpretation.
Our goal is much more modest: to convince readers that Sunstein's proposed system asks
more of judges than they are capable of providing, and does so on the basis of fictions
concerning legislative behavior no less fictional than those used by approaches Sunstein condemns. In other writings, one of the authors has proposed a competing system that asks less
of judges by conferring greater discretion on agencies. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of
the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 NYU L Rev 1239
(1989); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions,41 Vand L Rev 301 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am U L Rev
391, 407-17 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutionaland Political Theory
in Administrative Law, 64 Tex L Rev 469 (1985).
10 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 425 (cited in note 1) (structuralism depends on the
assumption that statutes are internally consistent and coherent), 426-28 (characterization of
legislative purpose is act of creation rather than discovery), 428 (unrealistic to expect legislative rather than judicial response to changed circumstances), 428-32 (Congress enacts a
statute's words, not its legislative history or "intent"), 433 (difficult to aggregate the "intentions" of a multimember body), 445 (requiring judicial deference to all agency interpretations of law ignores legislative distrust of agency discretion), 449-50 (understanding statutes
as deals is problematic because public officials often respond to their own conception of the
public interest, multiple forces are involved in producing a statute, and pluralist systems
reflect collective action problems, strategic behavior, cycling, and other difficulties).
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complete and fictive nature of the enterprise of interpreting texts
leads him astray in two ways. He employs inappropriate criteria to
reject other interpretive systems, and he fails to subject his own
system to the correct evaluative criterion: whether the principles of
construction in use allow judges and legislators to cooperate effectively in making and applying legal norms.
In Part II we critique Sunstein's canonical approach to statutory interpretation as a system intended to avoid recourse to fiction in the ascertainment of statutory meaning. While we accept
the value of Sunstein's analysis of the effects pathologies have on
the statutory regimes agencies implement, we believe that Sunstein's remedies require the adoption of new interpretive fictions
even more intractable than those employed by traditional modes of
statutory construction. The choice of fictions is not, as Sunstein
suggests, a simple matter of applying the social science literature
of one's choosing to the legal process. Sunstein, we believe, fails to
consider the distortions imposed by the fictions he has chosen.
I.

A.

FICTION AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Interpretive Fictions

The business of statutory interpretation consists in giving
meanings to words, a task more difficult than it sounds. Much
twentieth-century scholarship in philosophy, literary criticism, linguistics, and psychology has focused on the problem of meaning
and the mysterious process by which it is infused into what are
now fashionably called "texts." Here we only intend to make use of
a few notions that we believe have become common intellectual
property as a result of this "textual revolution."
As an initial premise, then, we may say uncontroversially that
the meaning of words depends largely on social context.1 This is
no less true of complex written instruments than it is of the simple
verbal expressions of everyday life. We join with others in social
practices and share beliefs reinforced by those practices, thus we
can refer to a common context that gives meaning to statements of
or pertaining to those practices. A shared appreciation of team
sports, for example, allows newspaper readers to absorb the rheto11 "Social context" should be distinguished from "linguistic context," which refers to

the words surrounding a particular expression. The linguistic context of this footnote is the
text above it on the page; the social context of this footnote is a complex shared understanding of what it means to read a law review, and more particularly what it means to read a
"commentary" on another author's law review article. As used in this article, "context" refers to the social rather than the linguistic context of language.
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ric of sports writing, with all its metaphors of violence and military
confrontation, without believing that Sunday's football game was
really the small-scale war the literal language of Monday's newspaper seems to describe.
This organizational aspect of meaning is captured in the
phrase "interpretive community. ' 12 The interpretive community,
for our purposes, is simply the social group whose shared comprehension of a context makes possible the common interpretation of
socially relevant texts. The group element is absolutely necessary
to the interpretive process. If the context in which each reader
functions is too idiosyncratic-devoid of shorthand reductions
of experience portable enough to be shared-w"meaning" is
threatened.
The context shared by members of the interpretive community is more than a consensus about facts. The context underlying
our comprehension of the sports page is not merely a factual agreement about football games (a consensus as to the rules, the conditions of participation, etc.); it is a complex combination of beliefs,
myths, and rituals concerning football. The community interprets
the symbolism of the sports page not solely by reference to facts on
which the community agrees, but also in relation to other symbols
which the community holds in common. Understanding those
other symbols, which we may call the culture of football, is a necessary precondition to the successful interpretation of the sports
page.
Because symbolic elements of context play a strong role in the
process of interpretation, the "meaning" of a public statement or
action may rest on folklore or beliefs that have no basis in fact. In
connection with the celebration of Washington's birthday, for example, we correctly construe depictions of a cherry tree, even
though most of us realize that the story linking George Washington
and the cherry tree is wholly fictitious. The fictive nature of the
link casts no doubt, however, on the correctness of our interpretation; indeed, the "meaning" of the cherry tree can only be ascertained by reference to a widely shared belief.
In the instance of the cherry tree and Washington's birthday,
the fictive nature of the interpretive context is taken for granted
by all interpreters-the fable has been around at least since Par" The phrase "interpretive community," and its most comprehensive definition (somewhat different from the one implied here), is found in the work of Stanley Fish. See generally Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities 338-55 (Harvard, 1980).
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son Weems,'5 and its invocation is automatic rather than a concerted attempt to understand the otherwise ambiguous symbol of
the cherry tree. But sometimes it is necessary for us to create fictive contexts deliberately in order to understand complex and ambiguous events. The purposive invention of stories about the world
arises precisely from our need for a common context.
Simplified models of the world, even if based on deliberate
falsehoods, inevitably become part of the technology of meaning.
For example, when emancipated slaves referred to Abraham Lincoln as Moses, leading his people out of captivity, they gave explicit voice to a fictionalized context in which the Emancipation
Proclamation could be understood. To those outside the interpretive community, the "meaning" of the Emancipation Proclamation
predicated on this fiction may seem impossibly partial or just plain
wrong. But the fiction "Lincoln as Moses" was of great value to the
community that created it, for it made possible the understanding
of an event so complicated and ambiguous as otherwise to defy
comprehension.14 The more complex the actual context of a communicative act the more likely it is that the act will be interpreted
through recourse to a conventionalized or fictionalized context that
is simple enough to be shared by all the relevant recipients of the
communication.
At the same time that the fiction performs this invaluable
function of making interpretation possible, it also excludes certain
interpretations that are inconsistent with the central metaphor.
Explanations based upon expediency, cynicism, or even ambivalence in Lincoln's approach to emancipation are now impossible
within the interpretive community that created the "Lincoln as
Moses" fiction. Such interpretations cannot be ventured precisely
because the community no longer has a shared context in which
they could be understood; they have become literally
''meaningless."
These contextualizing stories about the world are what we
mean by the phrase "interpretive fictions." Interpretive fictions are
conventionalized descriptions that make communication comprehensible by providing a common basis for the social process of in13 Mason L. Weems, The Life of Washington 11-12 (Belknap, 1962) (first published

1800).
14

See Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery 529

(Random House, 1979). For an illuminating example of the deliberate use of the fiction of
interpretation by an outsider to the interpretive community, consider Andrew Johnson's
speech to the black people of Nashville after Lincoln's assassination, promising that "unworthy as I am, if no better shall be found, I will be your Moses." Id.
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terpretation. Many if not most interpretive fictions recount a stylized view of the speaker or main participant. After all, it is the
context of the speech or event that goes far to "explain" its meaning. In some circumstances the conventionalized or fictionalized reality will be made explicit in the process of interpretation, as in the
case of the "Lincoln as Moses" metaphor. But in other instances
the stylized view of the world remains implicit and can only be
glimpsed through the interpretation itself.
When interpretive fictions are invoked implicitly, they can
generate rules for understanding speech. It is in this sense that interpretive fictions become not primary but secondary instruments,
machine tools in the technology of meaning. The process by which
fictions are formalized into rules of interpretation can be simple
and immediate. For example, we depict the used car salesman in a
widely-shared interpretive fiction as a trickster and a confidence
man whose business is the deception of the unwary. From the creation of the fiction to the rule of interpretation ("never believe what
a used car salesman says") is but a single easy step. But the process of formalization is not always so easy, or so complete. For
many purposes the fiction need not be formalized at all. The impulse to create rules of interpretation is not uniformly strong
throughout the culture, and there are comparatively few occasions
of interpretation that are thought to require the elucidation of a
comprehensive set of interpretive rules.
In the environment of the law, on the other hand, we consider
rules of linguistic interpretation highly desirable. But the source of
canons of construction, like other rules of interpretation, remains
fiction. And in the concept of the canons we meet the juncture between the fictions of interpretation and the fictions of the law.
B.

Legal Fictions

As commentators have observed at least since the time of
Blackstone and Bentham, the common law has been particularly
fertile in the creation of pretenses for the resolution of legal
problems. These "legal fictions" operate by altering or presuming
the facts of lawsuits rather than by explicit amendment of the
rules of law that would otherwise apply to the particular dispute.1"
Each fiction has a subject matter, comprised of the premise or
15 For a general discussion of the role of fiction in the history of common law theory,
see Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory: Some HistoricalReflections, 1989 Tel-Aviv U Stud L - (forthcoming). See also Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions
(Stanford, 1967).
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premises maintained by the law without regard to their factual
truth in any given lawsuit. For example, fictions may address the
parties' status or their prior transactions in the case before the
court, or the existence or relationship of third parties, places, or
things not before the court. Fictions may also assert facts about
the tribunal. For example, the court itself becomes the subject
matter of fiction when the King is said to be always in it.'" And
when the plaintiff states in his pleading that the island of Minorca
is located within the parish of Mary-le-Bow in the ward of Cheap
1
in the city of London, the subject matter of the fiction is obvious. 7
Legal fictions can be invoked either explicitly or implicitly.
The explicit invocation of a fiction involves the formal declaration-in pleadings, judicial opinions, or other parts of the documentary record-of false statements of fact that are given significant legal effect. The implicit invocation of a fiction, by contrast,
attaches legal consequences to inferences from a spurious factual
premise not disclosed in the language of the opinion or pleading.
The plea that Paris is located in London is the simplest possible
example of an explicit fiction. The traditional immunity of the
British government in tort is an example of a rule based on an
implicit fiction; it rests on the premise (often taken for granted
rather than stated in the cases) that "the King can do no wrong."' 8
16See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 260 (Chicago,
1979) (originally published 1765). This fiction begins in a story explaining the role of the
royal judges, who are said to be merely the corporeal evidence of the King's presence. But
the fiction of the King's presence, serving at first a symbolic purpose, comes to have operational effect. Because the King is always present in court, he can never suffer a default
judgment. Id. Here, the story developed into a legal fiction because the presumed fact of
presence has legal consequences attached to it. The effect is to premise a legal rule (the
government never defaults) on what is in this instance a specious factual foundation (the
King is actually in his courts).
17 The goal of this surprising statement, which seems to have been perfectly acceptable
and entirely incontrovertible in the fifteenth century, is to establish venue and avoid choice
of law difficulties in cases involving bills of exchange made abroad and payable at home. See
YB Mich 15 Ed IV, f 14, p1 18 (1576) (Calais in Kent); YB Pasch 20 Hen VI, f 28, p1 21
(1443) (Paris in London).
" This fiction has a particularly rich and extensive history which, like the fiction that
the King is always in court, begins in a quasi-mystical expression of royal greatness. To this
expression legal consequences attach. If the King can do no wrong, then he cannot be supposed to have authorized or ratified wrongs done by his agents, thus neither he nor his
servants are answerable for their torts. Therefore it becomes possible to determine authoritatively that, although the Crown may be sued on its contracts, there can be no entitlement
to recovery by a shipowner whose vessel was burned by the Royal Navy off the coast of
Africa on the mistaken impression that it was engaging in the slave trade. Tobin v The
Queen, 143 Eng Rep 1148 (CP 1864). See also Featherv The Queen, 122 Eng Rep 1191 (KB
1865) (suit for patent infringement will not lie against servants of Crown because Queen can
do no wrong). For a brief general review of this fiction's history, see Peter H. Schuck, Suing
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Then there are the largely implicit fictional assumptions that
judges make about the group behavior of legislators that are and
have been the foundation of judicial interpretation of legislative
documents. The fundamental fiction, one so broad as to escape being primarily legal at all, may be called the fiction of collective intent. Courts have always supposed that the group of individuals
clothed with the authority to make statutes possesses a specific in19
tention attributable to all the individuals who voted in favor.
Kenneth Arrow, generalizing an illustration suggested by Condorcet, has proven the fictional nature of this universal judicial
supposition. 0
The methods available for divining collective intent require
even further resort to the patently untrue. The modern American
approach, to which we have grown so inured that its strangeness
no longer strikes the eye, is to presume that legislators have a
meaningful connection to the mass of official-looking printed material commonly known as "legislative history." Here the subject
matter of the fiction is implicit. It is the proposition that legislators read, or are at least conversant with and vote on the basis of,
the facts and arguments contained in committee reports, hearing
transcripts, and floor debates. Only slight acquaintance with the
process is necessary to discover incontrovertible evidence that
most legislators are ignorant of the overwhelming majority of "legislative history." Frequently, they are entirely unaware of the lit21
eral content of the statute itself.
The modern fiction of legislative history is not the only fictive
device spawned by the problem of collective intent. The long line
of English cases construing new enactments in pari materia with
Government 30-35 (Yale, 1983).
19 For a particularly ironic example of the early use of this interpretive fiction, consider
the response of one fourteenth-century royal judge to counsel's attempt to put an unwelcome construction on a statute with whose passage the judges on the Bench, by virtue of
their presence in Parliament, had been concerned: "Do not gloss the Statute; we understand
it better than you do, for we made it." Aumeye v Anon, YB Mich 33 Ed I, 78, 82 (1305).
20 See Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (John Wiley & Sons,
1951); M. le Marquis de Condorcet, Essai Sur l'Application de l'Analyse ?i la Probabilitg
des Decisions Rendues & la Pluralit6 des Voix (Chelsea, 1972) (originally published 1785).
21For a remarkably courageous example of realist statutory interpretation along these
lines, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Sorenson v Secretary of the Treasury,
475 US 851, 866-67 (1986), which concludes Congress had no intention with regard to an
obscure provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, a "vast piece of hurriedly enacted legislation." See also Neal E. Devins, AppropriationsRedux: A CriticalLook
at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 Duke L J 389, 399 (due to time constraints, the vast majority of members of Congress did not have an opportunity to read the
2,100-page appropriations resolution prior to vote).
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prior legislation on the same subject is also the product of fiction.2 2
It is sometimes suggested that such construction is possible because Parliament is eternal and speaks with one voice. It is also
suggested, more naturalistically, that the members of the legislature are presumed to act in full knowledge of the existing state of
the law.2 While the implicit subject matter of the fiction is thus
variable, the resort to fiction is recurrent.
Systems of statutory interpretation also rest on legal fictions.
For example, Hart and Sacks 24 did not urge judges to attribute an
internally consistent set of public-regarding purposes to Congress
because they actually believed that Congress behaves in a manner
consistent with their interpretive system. They understood that
Congress is not always coherent, that different members vote for
statutes to further different purposes, that those purposes are
often inconsistent, and that some of the purposes are to advance
private interests.2 5 Hart and Sacks urged their interpretive approach because they believed that judges are likely to create results more appropriate to the judicial function and to the legal order if they interpret statutes in a manner intended to further some
set of internally consistent, public-regarding purposes ascribed to
2'
Congress.
Like other interpretive regimes, the Supreme Court's approach in Chevron is premised on a series of fictions. The Court
concluded that agencies should have the dominant role in interpreting ambiguous agency-administered statutes because: (1) Congress has delegated this power to agencies; and (2) the politically
accountable President will control those policy decisions Congress

2

The classic expression of the approach is Lord Mansfield's: "Where there are differ-

ent statutes in pari materia though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other." The King v Loxdale, 1 Burr 445, 448 (KB 1758) (emphasis in
original). See Fortunatus Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes 699-701 (Littell, 1835).
22 See The Queen v The Inhabitantsof Watford, 115 Eng Rep 1413 (QB 1846); Jones v
Brown, 154 Eng Rep 519 (Exch 1848); Barlow v Teal, 15 QBD 403 (1885); Ex parte the
County Council of Kent, 1 QBD 725 (1891).
24 Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, 2 The Legal Process 1148-79 (Cambridge,
tent ed 1958).
25 Id at 937, 949-50 (proponents of licensing statutes and food standardization rules
often are motivated by desire to restrict competition).
2 Thus, Hart and Sacks consistently refer to "the purpose which ought to be attributed" to Congress in enacting a statute. Id at 1153, 1157 (emphasis added). They explain
the basis for their interpretive system by reference to the goals of the legal system, rather
than the goals of Congress: "The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign
to the idea of law and inadmissable." Id at 1156.
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has declined to make through his control over the agencies. Both
premises are fictional in most cases. The modern phenomenon of
divided government has added constant partisan rivalry to the preexisting institutional rivalry between the politically accountable
branches.28 In this political environment, Congress rarely "intends" to give the President greater policymaking power. Even
when Congress does intend to give the President policymaking
power, the President rarely exercises that power.2 9 He is not even
aware of most of the interpretive disputes agencies resolve.
We have no quarrel with Sunstein's characterization of the
Chevron regime as premised on fictions.3 0 No method of statutory
interpretation can be rejected on that basis, however, because all
interpretive regimes are built on a series of fictions. Chevron must
stand or fall on bases independent of the factual or fictive nature
of its formal premises. An incomplete list of legal realist premises
for Chevron might include the following: 3 '
(1) If Congress recognizes that ambiguous statutory language
increases the President's power, Congress is less likely to
choose ambiguous language;
(2) If the electorate believes that the President has the power
to control agency policy decisions, it is more likely to hold the
President politically accountable for those decisions. This, in
turn, will increase the President's incentive to exercise control
over policymaking in the administrative state to the extent
that Congress has left policy decisions open;
See Chevron, 467 US at 865-66:
Judges... are not part of either political branch of the Government ....
In contrast,
an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views
of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to
the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of Government to make such policy choices....
28 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 S Ct Rev 1, 40-41; Lloyd N. Cutler, Now Is the Time for All Good
Men..., 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 387 (1989); James L. Sundquist, The Question Is Clear, and
Party Government Is the Answer, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 425 (1989).
See Pierce, 64 NYU L Rev 1239 (cited in note 9).
30 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 445, 503 (cited in note 1). See also Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 517
(Chevron, like any other rule adopted in this field, is fictional).
' For more complete treatments, see Pierce, 41 Vand L Rev 301 (cited in note 9); Peter
L. Strauss, One HundredFifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093 (1987);
Pierce, 36 Am U L Rev 391, 407-17 (cited in note 9); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why
Administrators Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J L Econ & Org 81 (1985); Pierce, 64
Tex L Rev 469 (cited in note 9).
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(3) Agencies are better positioned than courts to "update"
statutes to reflect the latest scientific developments and prevailing political values to the extent ambiguous statutory language permits such updating;
(4) Agencies usually are better positioned than courts to identify regulatory pathologies and to adopt statutory interpretations that will counteract those pathologies;
(5) A single agency charged with responsibility to implement a
statute has a comparative advantage over hundreds of federal
judges in furthering the legal system's goals of consistent interpretation of national statutes and coherent interpretation
of functionally related statutory provisions.
This continuing resort to legal fictions as part of the technique
of statutory interpretation is somewhat less surprising when considered in relation to the general social tendency to establish interpretive fictions in all areas of social life. The legal fictions of statutory interpretation are also, in the formal sense, interpretive
fictions. Their purpose is to create a context in which the communications of the legislative process, known as statutes, can be understood by members of the interpretive community of the law.
These interpretive fictions take the form of fictive accounts of
the speaker, in this case the legislature. The choice among competing fictions must be based on an understanding of the complicated
characteristics of the speaker and of the interpretive community.
As changes occur in either, or as we gain a better understanding of
the characteristics of either the speaker or the interpretive community, we should reevaluate our choice of fictions. The weight given
to legislative history in contemporary statutory interpretation is
based on an interpretive fiction that associates individual legislators much more closely with the product of legislative staff work
than is justified by the facts. Thus, the movement away from reliance on legislative history is premised in part on changed perceptions of the dominant characteristics of the speaker.3 2 The move32 See, for example, Public Citizen v United States Dept. of Justice, 109 S Ct 2558,
2574-77 (1989) (Kennedy concurring) (criticizing majority for relying on selective references
to legislative history of statute to support creative interpretation desired by majority);
ACLU v FCC, 823 F2d 1554, 1583 (DC Cir 1987) (Starr dissenting in part) (stating that
judges have become "shamelessly profligate and unthinking" in their use of legislative history); Hirschey v FERC, 777 F2d 1, 7-8 (DC Cir 1985) (Scalia concurring) (criticizing assumption that details of committee reports, as opposed to broad outlines of statute's purpose, come to legislature's attention); Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History
(delivered between fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools in various forms), excerpted in Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
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ment away from Hart and Sacks's system toward an interpretive
regime that confers a greater role on agencies is based in part on
changes in the characteristics of the interpretive community. Over
800 judges with widely varying ideologies are unlikely to adopt
consistent and coherent statutory interpretations through use of
Hart and Sacks's fictions."
C.

Real Legislative History

It may be objected here, however, that a fictive context is not
absolutely necessary in order to interpret legislative action. The alternative would be to attempt to understand the legislature's actions not on the basis of what we imagine it to have done, but on
what it actually did. Such an approach to statutory interpretation
would rest on "real" legislative history as distinguished from the
current brand of imaginative literature, which is written for the
most part by staffers and lobbyists and has little or nothing to do
with the history of legislation.
Real legislative history seems to offer a significant escape from
the problems of interpretation outlined by Sunstein. Not only does
it provide the ultimate context for linguistic interpretation of statutes, it also allows the democratically-elected legislature to retain
control over legislation. After all, by consulting real legislative history we return lawmaking authority to the Congress. Where language seems ambiguous, or produces counterintuitive results in individual cases, the actual occurrences that led to the inclusion of
the relevant language would be dispositive.
This solution sounds appealing, but real legislative history is a
practical and philosophical impossibility. On the practical side
Va L Rev 423, 454-55 (1988) (arguing that interpretive doubts should not be resolved by
examining legislative intent due to constitutional ideals of "a government of laws not of
men," doctrine of separation of powers, and principle that where text of statute is clear,
legislative history should not be consulted); Bruce Fein, Scalia's Way, ABA J 38 (Feb 1990)
(discussing Justice Scalia's negative views on the use of legislative history to interpret statutes); Alex Kozinski, Hunt for Laws' 'True' Meaning Subverts Justice, Wall St J A14 (Jan
31, 1989) (use of imprecise statements in legislative history permits judge to implement personal sense of right and wrong); Robert A. Katzmann, Summary of Proceedings, in Robert
A. Katzmann, ed, Judges and Legislators:Toward InstitutionalComity 162, 170-75 (Brookings, 1988) (discussing Justice Scalia's argument that legislative history is malleable to any
purpose). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533
(1983) (use of statutory construction is only proper when statute directly addresses problem
or bestows power of revision on judges). But compare Farber and Frickey, 74 Va L Rev at
424-25 (discarding legislative history would deprive judges of useful tool).
" See Strauss, 87 Colum L Rev at 1105, 1117 (cited in note 31); Neil K. Komesar, A
Job for the Judges: The Judiciaryand the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society,
86 Mich L Rev 657, 662-63 (1988).
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there lies the task of exhaustively documenting the complex reality
that is the legislative process. Must a transcript of every telephone
call, every lunch-table conversation with a lobbyist, and every armtwisting message from the White House or the Democratic National Committee chairman be available to explain why Congress
employed a particular verbal subterfuge to render indistinct the
politically charged consequences of pending legislation? Just the
documentation of the public portion of the legislative process, if
exhaustively undertaken, is a daunting task. Even after a century
of time has passed, the issues have been clearly identified, the letters and speeches of individuals have come to rest in archives
where they can be calmly inspected, and the passion of political
drama has dimmed, understanding the historical environment of
complex legislation remains a frightfully difficult task. 4
The practical obstacles to determining the reality of the legislative process, however, are merely a clue to the deeper intractability of the enterprise resulting from the inherent indeterminacy of
the historiographic process itself. Lord Acton's notion of "absolute
history" has no adherents in the contemporary world.3 5 Indeed,
most historians and philosophers of history agree that a complete
account of the causal sequence of events in the past is beyond the
capacity of historians. The contemporary consensus is probably
closer to the idea that narrative structures used to explain the past
are themselves artificially constraining, and that history, however
undertaken, is largely the process of imposing cultural conventions
of interpretation on the resistant surface of accessible factual detail. 6 "Real" legislative history cannot be complete because no his' Take for example the history of the Interstate Commerce Act. Although the "legislative history" of the ICA was available throughout the twentieth century, this by no means
resolved the conflict among historians over the political origins of railroad regulation. Not
until the 1960s did historians begin to consider the possibility that the railroads, far from
opposing the institution of federal regulation, might have sought regulation as a financially
attractive alternative to competition. This interpretive possibility resulted in the search for,
and discovery of, new sources of the ICA, and a correspondingly significant reinterpretation
of the statute and its origins. See Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916
(Princeton, 1965). Nor was this reinterpretation in the 1960s the end of the search for the
"real legislative history" of the ICA. In 1989-over 100 years after passage of the ICA-a
team of researchers concluded that ICA was motivated by a desire to discriminate against
long-haul shippers in favor of short-haul shippers. Thomas W. Gilligan, William J. Marshall,
and Barry R. Weingast, Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, 32 J L & Econ 35 (1989).
35 See generally John Emerich Edward Acton, Lectures on Modern History (Macmillan, 1906). See also Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? 15-16 (Knopf, 1962).
"1 For an extended investigation of the relation of literary conventions and patterns of
historical explanation, see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in
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tory is complete. Even if every ambiguous invocation of statutory

text could be resolved by the record of legislative deliberation, the
inherent indeterminacies of the historical process would render
some cases hard precisely because the resolving power of historiography would not be great enough to recover the necessary
evidence.
D. Fiction and Indeterminacy
The thought experiment with real legislative history is not
wasted, however. Our failure warns us that the relationship among
the adjectives used by Sunstein to criticize existing styles of statutory interpretation ("incomplete," "indeterminate," and "fictional") is more complex than Sunstein recognizes. Fiction is a response to the indeterminacy problem: if we cannot ascertain the
actual facts that lie behind words, we can at least agree on a story
about the origin of those words that permits consistent interpretation under most circumstances. Sunstein views fiction and indeterminacy as unrelated evils that can beset a system of statutory interpretation. He demands instead a process of interpretation that
is "complete" (in the sense of providing an exclusive procedure for
resolving all disputes concerning the meaning of statutory language) without resort to conventions or consciously false narratives
about legislative behavior.
In this sense even real legislative history is incomplete. As
Sunstein himself shows, an exhaustive knowledge of the legislature's past actions and the legislators' past intentions will not resolve all cases because later circumstances in the statute's applica87
tion are concededly ones about which no legislator ever thought.
And as discussed earlier, real legislative history could not overcome
the problem of indeterminacy either; it only forces us to perceive
that indeterminacy is a characteristic of history, not merely a characteristic of some contemporary theories of statutory
interpretation.
The only solution to the joint problems of incompleteness and
indeterminacy is fiction, and it is to the building of interpretive
fictions that all writers on the subject of statutory interpretation,
including Sunstein, devote their time. What is objectionable about
Sunstein's approach is that he fails to admit the inevitable admixture of fiction in the composition of his interpretive norms. The
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Johns Hopkins, 1973).
" Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 426, 432 n 96, 433-34 (cited in note 1).
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consequence is that he does not justify his canons as fictions using
the appropriate criterion-their usefulness. Rather, he attempts to
establish on formal grounds that his norms evade the application
of his pejoratives, because they are neither incomplete, indeterminate, nor fictional. When Sunstein's canons are viewed realistically,
with their fictive elements acknowledged rather than disowned, the
focus shifts to whether they are in fact useful as fictions. On this
more intensely practical ground his fictions are readily found wanting. To that proposition we now turn.
II.

SUNSTEIN'S FICTIONS AND CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Sunstein's canons of construction are an appeal to a shared
community of interpretation and are based on distincf fictions of
interpretation. Analysis of those fictions illuminates the genesis of
Sunstein's canons of construction but also provides some basis for
discomfort with the practical application of his canons.
A.

Sunstein's Stories About Government

Like the traditional canons of construction, Sunstein's are
based. on interpretive fictions that primarily depict the workings of
Congress. The fictions are necessary in order to establish a shared
concept of the speaker whose speech is the Statutes at Large.
What distinguishes Sunstein's fictions from the ones underpinning
the traditional approaches to statutory construction is Sunstein's
unflattering depiction of the legislature.3 8 Sunstein's principles of
statutory construction are explicitly based on a caricature of the
legislature's pathologies rather than its excellences.
The particular focus of Sunstein's interpretive fictions is Congress's failure to adhere to the principles of civic republicanism.
Sunstein's fictions paint the following picture. The legislature frequently engages in the manufacture of preferences for favored individuals and groups. It often magnifies the advantages that large
organizations or groups of organizations already enjoy when they
confront loose aggregations of consumers, homeless people, children in need of welfare support, and other social groups crippled
by relatively high organization and information costs. It also fails
"' So far as we are aware, interpretive systems predicated on pathological caricatures of
legislatures are a product of the 1980s. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 Va L Rev
275, 278-79 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223 (1986); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4 (1984).
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to acknowledge its responsibility for difficult value choices when it
constructs administrative machinery, sometimes abdicating to
agencies difficult choices that cannot be comfortably resolved in
the political arena. Sometimes it fails in the opposite manner, hobbling sensible public-regarding administrative schemes with irrational restrictions (such as the Delaney Clauses9 ).
In characterizing these views as interpretive fictions, we are
not saying that Sunstein's positions are false, or even that he has
made them up. There is much basis of truth in them. More importantly, the insights, whether true or not, are widely shared. 4 0 It is
this broad degree of general acceptance that makes the stories
plausible candidates for the role of interpretive fictions. But like
all interpretive fictions, the rules of interpretation that they generate are incomplete. The fictions exclude possible interpretations of
reality, not because such interpretations are impermissibly in conflict with the substantive reality the fictions represent, but rather
because they are inconsistent with the purely stylistic elements of
the fictions.
As a central example, let us take one of Sunstein's stories
about legislative pathology. A key element of his approach is that
any given area of the administrative state (for example, environmental regulation) has a single operative pathology. In Sunstein's
story, producers of pollution are organized and consumers of pollution are individuals who cannot easily overcome collective action
problems; thus legislation will be written in a sneakily pro-polluter
fashion. The proper interpretive rule, based on this story, is Sunstein's canon 3(b), that environmental statutes should be inter'41
preted "aggressively.
But, of course, it is possible to imagine an environmental statute that results not from this confrontation between organized polluters and disorganized consumers, but from a naked preference
granted to one industry in the form of overaggressive environmental regulation of its competitors. The sort of legislature Sunstein
describes certainly could produce such a result. That legislative
body, like the human body to which it is compared, can suffer from
3- 21 USC § 348 (c)(3)(A) (1988), discussed in Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 422-23, 49697 (cited in note 1); see text at notes 51-58.
40 For excellent general discussions of public choice theory and the legislative process,

see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understandingof Public Law, 65
Chi Kent L Rev 123 (1989); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 Va L Rev 167
(1988); Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 Tex
L Rev 873 (1987).
41 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 478 (cited in note 1).
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several illnesses at once. Sunstein's interpretive fiction, however,
focuses on a single pathology at a time, and the canons of construction are organized accordingly, following not the logical structure
of the world as described by the interpretive fiction, but rather the
interior literary logic of the fiction itself. As we show below, that
several legislative pathologies may plague the same legislative enactment is a problem to which Sunstein has not been attentive,
despite the plethora of real-world examples. The reader may conclude that the root of the problem lies in the ease with which interpretive fictions acquire, like legal fictions, operational consequences. Rather than merely summarizing reality, their
conventionalizing power comes to define reality in ways that make
a difference.
B. Sunstein's Canons and the Interpretive Community
Like all other interpretive fictions, Sunstein's serve to define
the boundaries of the community of belief, because only those accepting the fictions as legitimate schemata of reality form the interpretive community. Thus statutory interpretations based upon
particular fictions are convincing only to those for whom the fiction represents a reasonable, if compressed, representation of the
context. Not all onlookers, after all, thought Abraham Lincoln a
Mosaic figure. Sunstein's fictions appeal to believers of what he
and others have called liberal republicanism. They also conform to
a certain kind of institutionalized distrust of Congress that has
steadily gained ground in American public opinion in the past
thirty years. Sunstein's fictions will not necessarily appeal to all
the members of the interpretive community, however, which for
operational purposes Sunstein equates with the 800-plus members
42
of the federal judiciary.
C. Ambiguity, Legislative Supremacy, and the Power of Sunstein's Canons
It is important to note just how much power the interpretive
community adopting Sunstein's canons will have. Before describing
the proposed canons, we consider the role Sunstein urges for the
canons. He says that his canons should control judicial interpreta42 Sunstein recognizes that the interpretive community includes agency administrators.
Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 413 (cited in note 1). Consistent with his rejection of Chevron,
however, he focuses his discussion almost entirely on judges.
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tion of agency-administered statutes only in cases of ambiguity. '
Consistent with this limited purpose, Sunstein pays frequent homage to the principle of legislative supremacy. 4" The principle of legislative supremacy, however, causes more trouble for Sunstein than
he seems willing to admit.
Anyone proposing canons of construction must ultimately be
prepared to explain whether these canons are binding upon the
legislature. To assent to the principle of legislative supremacy is to
admit that the legislature is not bound by the canons. If Sunstein
is to retain belief in legislative supremacy as a feature of his system, therefore, he must anticipate the hard case in which Congress
chooses to pass legislation embodying its own canons, contradicting
those selected by Sunstein. If Congress passes a statute proclaiming that environmental regulations are to be interpreted narrowly
by the courts, is that congressionally selected canon determinative
in the interpretation of future statutes? Or is the congressional decision to enact this anti-canon an expression of "legislative pathology" that the courts ought to "correct"? The status of the canons
as a species of meta-legislation conceals a conflict between the act
of canon-making and the belief in legislative supremacy, but only
so long as Congress refrains from expanding the general principles
of construction embodied in the first title of the United States
Code to embrace the matters discussed by Sunstein.
In order to finesse this difficulty, Sunstein limits his canons to
the resolution of statutory "ambiguity." In the merely ambiguous
statute, after all, Congress has not created the conflict over interpretive rules that strains the commitment to legislative supremacy.
But the intellectual constraint involved in applying the canons
only in areas of ambiguity is too severe for Sunstein to abide by for
long. His illustrative examples of the canons' operation are inconsistent with the modesty of the claim. He uses his canons both to
find ambiguity where it does not otherwise exist and to resolve the
ambiguity so found.
Sunstein returns repeatedly to two interpretive disputes to illustrate the manner in which the canons would operate. 45 In Industrial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Institute ("Ben-

43S

Id at 464.

I Id at 424, 434, 456, 460, 465-66. For an excellent discussion of the meaning and importance of legislative supremacy, see Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Georgetown L J 281 (1989).
" Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 419, 423, 458, 478, 480, 489-92, 494, 496-97 (cited in
note 1).
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zene"), a four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court interpreted
the Occupational Safety and Health Act to require the agency to
make a threshold finding that the preexisting level of exposure to a
toxic substance in the workplace creates a "significant risk" to
workers before the agency can impose any lower limit on the level
to which workers can be exposed. 4" Like other commentators, 47
Sunstein is unable to reconcile the plurality's interpretation with
the language or legislative history of the Act.48 He concludes that
the Court interpreted the statute to require a finding that Congress never required. In Justice Marshall's words, the plurality's
standard bore "no connection with the acts or intentions of Congress. 4 9 Sunstein goes on, however, to praise the plurality for acting responsibly because its disingenuous interpretation is consistent with his proposed canons. 0 In Sunstein's view, allowing the
agency to regulate without first making a finding of "significant
risk" would be consistent with congressional intent, but it would
be wrong because it would produce bad results.
Sunstein's second illustrative case is the D.C. Circuit's decision in Public Citizen v Young,51 interpreting the Delaney Clause,
which prohibits the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from
approving the use of any color additives that "induce cancer when
ingested by man or animal. '"52 - The FDA adopted a new interpretation of the Delaney Clause that permitted it to approve color additives that are weak carcinogens. The D.C. Circuit reversed that interpretation, noting that both the language of the Act and its
legislative history demonstrated that Congress expressed an unambiguous intent to prohibit the FDA from approving any carcinogenic color additive no matter how weak and no matter what the
circumstances.
Writing for the court in Public Citizen, Judge Williams made
no secret of his desire to find an ambiguity in the Delaney Clause
or of his desire to defer to the FDA's interpretation of the Act.5 3
Both in his opinion in Public Citizen and elsewhere, Judge Wil46 448 US 607, 642 (1980).
41 See, for example, Pierce, 64 Tex L Rev at 475-85 (cited in note 9).
48 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 490-91 (cited in note 1).

448 US at 690 (Marshall dissenting).
Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 491 (cited in note 1).
52 831 F2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987).
" 21 USC § 348(c)(3)(A). For an excellent discussion of the three parallel provisions
that constitute the Delaney Clause, see Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the
Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?,5 Yale J Reg 1, 3-6 (1988).
53 831 F2d at 1113.
"
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liams has expressed his strongly held views that courts should de54
fer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions,
and that the absolutist philosophy underlying the Delaney Clause
55
is bad public policy that yields bad results in important contexts.
Notwithstanding his strong desire to affirm the FDA's interpretation, however, Judge Williams reluctantly concluded that Congress
had unambiguously adopted a policy precluding FDA approval of
any carcinogenic color additive.
Sunstein is highly critical of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Public Citizen.56 He argues that the court should have relied on one or
more of his proposed canons both to find an ambiguity and to resolve that ambiguity in a manner that permits the FDA to approve
color additives that are weak carcinogens. 7 Sunstein recognizes
that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the original
it would improve the perintent of Congress, but he argues 5that
8
formance of the regulatory system.

These examples illustrate the extraordinary strength of the
canons Sunstein proposes. The canons would authorize a judge to
add statutory requirements Congress never intended to impose and
to amend or delete statutory requirements Congress did intend to
impose. Allocating to judges, guided only by Sunstein's canons,
this extraordinary degree of policymaking power is consistent with
Sunstein's unequivocal rejection of the "judge as an honest agent"
theory of statutory interpretation.5 9 According to Sunstein, judges

cannot confine themselves to the modest role of determining and
enforcing congressional intent because, notwithstanding the efforts
of the Framers to create a legislative process that minimizes the
likelihood of factionalism, 0 the legislative process continues to
54 See, for example, Associated Gas Distributorsv FERC, 824 F2d 981, 997-1001 (DC
Cir 1987).
55 See, for example, Union of Concerned Scientists v NRC, 824 F2d 108, 121 (DC Cir
1987) (Williams concurring).
88 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 496-97 (cited in note 1).
57 Id. Sunstein relies on his proposed canons to interpret statutes to avoid obsolescence
and in favor of de minimis exceptions to support his contention that the term "induce cancer" is ambiguous. In a nutshell, he argues that Congress originally chose this statutory
language based on a mistaken belief that only a few substances "induce cancer." He argues
that Congress never intended to prohibit the use of the hundreds of substances that modern

science has shown to be carcinogenic. See id.
58 Id at 422-23, 496-97.
50 Id at 437-41, 460-62.

60 See Federalists 9 (Hamilton), 10 (Madison), 45 (Madison), 51 (Madison), 57
(Madison), 58 (Madison), 61 (Hamilton), 62 (Madison), and 73 (Hamilton), in Jacob E.

Cooke, ed, The Federalist50, 56, 308, 347, 384, 391, 410, 415, 492 (Wesleyan, 1961). See also

Pierce, 64 NYU L Rev at 1248 (cited in note 9).
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perform imperfectly. Thus, judges must take responsibility to
counteract the potential effects of a wide range of political and regulatory pathologies. 1
D.

Sunstein's Canons in Detail

Sunstein seems to recognize that his proposed canons are incomplete in the sense that the general principles he uses to generate the current set of canons can and should be used to extend the
canons to other forms of political and regulatory pathology that he
does not address. 2 He promises to flesh out his canons as one component of his future research agenda. Even in their incipient truncated form, however, Sunstein's canons require judges to undertake daunting responsibilities in the process of interpreting
agency-administered statutes.
Sunstein proposes three categories of canons: (1) canons derived from constitutional values; (2) canons derived from understandings of how alternative statutory interpretations will improve
the performance of political institutions; and (3) canons that will
enhance the performance of a regulatory regime by counteracting
or avoiding the typical causes of regulatory and statutory failure. 3
Each category contains a long list of canons. 4 Sunstein recognizes
the inevitability of conflicts among his proposed canons. 6 He
solves the problem partly by ranking the canons according to their
importance. 6 Any canon in category (1) trumps any canon in categories (2) or (3), and canons within each category are rank-ordered
as well. Sunstein recognizes, however, that ranking alone is inadequate as a device to resolve intercanon conflicts. In some contexts,
a generically less important political or regulatory pathology may
be of greater concern than a generically more important pathology.
Thus, courts must harmonize the canons based "not simply on the
applicability of interpretive norms, but also on the degree of their
infringement."6 7 While canon (1)(g) would trump canon (3)(c) in
the typical case, a court should resolve the intercanon conflict in
the opposite manner if it determines that a particular interpretive
dispute threatens greater infringement of the value from which
11Sunstein,

97 Yale L J at at 1544-47 (cited in note 6).
11 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 467 (cited in note 1).
63 Id at 466-68.
- Id at 406, 468-89.
65 Id at 497.
66 Id at 498-99.
67 Id

at 499.
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canon (3)(c) is derived than the value from which canon (1)(g) is
derived.
1. Canons based on constitutional norms.
Category (1), Sunstein's constitutional canons, 68 begins with
canons that are relatively uncontroversial, at least when stated as
abstractions: (a) statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional invalidity and constitutional doubts; (b) statutes should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the assumption that states
have authority to regulate their own citizens and territory; and (c)
statutes should be interpreted to enhance political accountability
and to preserve the system of checks and balances.6 9 As Sunstein

notes, courts have long applied these canons, at least to some degree and in some classes of cases. The problems inherent in implementing the category (1) canons are likely to emerge from two
sources-intercanon conflicts and disagreements concerning the
existence and significance of some of the constitutional values that
form the basis for some of Sunstein's canons.
The first source of problems can be illustrated by considering
Sunstein's canon (1)(b): statutes should be interpreted consistent
with "the basic assumption [] that states have authority to regulate their own citizens and territory.

70

Sunstein's constitutional

canons would be incomplete unless they recognized two recurrent
political and regulatory pathologies inconsistent with canon (1)(b):
first, the tendency of state regulation to create significant positive
and negative interstate spillovers in an increasingly integrated
economy, ecology, and society; second, the greater susceptibility of
smaller political units to capture by factions. These two wellknown pathologies are constantly in tension with Sunstein's canon
(1)(b). They can be counteracted by interpreting statutes to further the constitutional values that underlie the Supremacy Clause
and the Commerce Clause.
Sunstein urges courts to invoke a clear statement rule
designed to further the constitutionally recognized value of state
and local autonomy: only Congress can preempt a state regulation
and then only by doing so explicitly.7 1 It is difficult to reconcile
this rule with Sunstein's description of political pathologies in
Congress, however. A sufficiently deliberative and rational Con68Id at 468-74.
41 Id at 468-71.
7o Id
71 Id.

at 469.
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gress would authorize federal agencies to preempt state regulations
that create significant negative interstate spillovers or that are
symptomatic of factionalism. Because Sunstein's judges are
charged with the herculean task of interpreting statutes to avoid
the effects of political pathologies, canon (1)(b) seems to require a
corollary: judges should interpret federal statutes to permit federal
agencies to preempt state regulations that create significant interstate harms or that are symptomatic of factionalism. The Supreme
Court appears to have adopted and applied precisely such a corollary in City of New York v FCC.72 Of course, in all interesting
cases the canon and its corollary would conflict, and a judge would
have to determine which should control. This may be the decisionmaking process Sunstein has in mind. In describing proposed
canon (1)(b), he acknowledges that the clear statement principle is
"no substitute for an inquiry into the relationship between state
and federal law in the particular context . . . . , But if canon
(1)(b) must constantly be balanced against its corollary, it is difficult to know what the canon means.
The other problem likely to arise in applying Sunstein's category (1) canons emerges upon examination of some of the constitutional values he urges courts to further through "aggressive" statutory interpretation. His constitutionally based canons do not end
with the abstractly noncontroversial constitutional values listed in
(1)(a), (b), and (c). Rather, they extend through five other subcategories. Each subcategory includes several canons. Some of the
constitutional values furthered by the canons are not likely to be
obvious to all judges. For example, in subcategory (1)(f), entitled
"disadvantaged groups," Sunstein asserts the existence of a constitutional norm protecting the rights of gays and lesbians. 74 In subcategory (1)(h), entitled "welfare rights," he asserts the existence
72 486 US 57, 64 (1988) (If the FCC's decision to preempt state and local signal-quality
regulations represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies committed to the
agency's care by statute, the decision should not be disturbed unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation "is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned."). See also NCNB Texas National Bank v Cowden, 895 F2d 1488, 1494,
1498 (5th Cir 1990). The Court seems increasingly receptive to an interpretive approach
that confers on federal agencies the power to preempt state regulations as long as the federal agency is acting within its jurisdictional limits. See, for example, Ray v Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 US 151, 178 (1978); Arkansas Electric Coop. Corp. v Arkansas Public Service
Comm., 461 US 375, 383 n 7 (1983). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism,and Administrative Law, 46 U Pitt L Rev 607, 636-61 (1985); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law and the Court, in Collected Legal Papers 291, 295-96 (Peter Smith,
1952); Federalist 10 (Madison) in Cooke, ed, The Federalist at 56 (cited in note 60).
7' Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 469 (cited in note 1).
74 Id at 472-73.
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of a constitutional right to "minimum levels of subsistence. 7 5 He
characterizes the many judicial decisions failing to enforce these
rights as evidence that the judiciary recognizes the rights but declines to enforce them for institutional reasons."8 In each case, his
answer is a canon requiring "aggressive construction" of statutes
that can be interpreted to implement these constitutional rights
that are currently unenforced by the judiciary.
The difficulty here lies in the less than universal acceptance of
Sunstein's assertion that protecting gay and lesbian rights and providing minimum levels of subsistence are constitutional norms.
More generally, judges who see in the constitution norms and values different from those Sunstein sees are likely to adopt "constitutional" canons of interpretation that differ materially from the
score or so proposed by Sunstein. Judges who believe, for instance,
that the Takings Clauses reflect a constitutional aversion to redistribution of wealth7 are likely to adopt dramatically different interpretations of many agency-administered statutes through Sunstein's proposed process of "aggressive construction" of statutes to
further unenforced constitutional norms.
2.

Canons based on institutional concerns.

The canons in Sunstein's second category are designed to respond to institutional concerns. 78 The list of concerns and corresponding canons includes such relatively noncontroversial canons
as the presumption against implied repeals and the presumption
against implied exemptions from taxation. 79 Many of the institutionally based canons also present serious application problems.
Proposed canons (2)(e) and (2)(f) illustrate the difficulty of choosing among canons. Canon (2)(f) requires courts to presume that
the legislature has not precluded judicial review of agency decisions.8 It is premised on Sunstein's assertions that agencies are
susceptible to factionalism and that the expectation of judicial review can deter factionalism. 1 Canon (2)(e) instructs reviewing
courts to defer to agency understandings of policy and fact. 82 It is
5 Id at 473-74.
76

Id at 472-74.

77 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Takings: PrivateProperty and the Power of Emi-

nent Domain (Harvard, 1985).
71 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 474-76 (cited in note 1).
79 Id at 475.
80 Id at 475-76.
81 Id at 475.
92 Id.
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premised on Sunstein's assertion that agencies are institutionally
superior to courts in terms of their political accountability and
their fact-finding capacity.8 3
It is easy to accept the premises that underlie these two proposed canons, but it is exceedingly difficult to know what courts
should do in light of them. Judicial review of agency decisions always imposes costs in the form of delay and uncertainty. If courts
adhere to both canons-always review but always defer to the
agency-these costs represent a deadweight social loss. If courts
temper their application of canon (2)(e) in light of canon (2)(f),
they risk misunderstanding the facts or imposing policies that lack
any source of political legitimacy. Many empirical studies of judicial review purport to document precisely this combination of effects-delay, uncertainty, misunderstanding of facts, and judicial
imposition of policies with questionable political legitimacy.84
At their logical limits, canons (2)(e) and (2)(f) are opposites.
Indeed, Sunstein seems to recognize this fact. In his discussion of
canon (2)(e), he notes with apparent approval that "the rare judicial decisions finding agency action not subject to judicial review
are based on perceptions that judicial intervention would likely be
counterproductive in the circumstances." 85 Does this mean that a
judge who shares Jerry Mashaw's belief that judicial review of
agency decisionmaking on the subjects of disabilities and highway
safety is counterproductive should find that those decisions are not
subject to judicial review?8" We suspect Sunstein would be among
the first to decry such a judicial decision. It would conflict with
proposed canon (2)(f) and several of his other proposed canons.8 '
8 Id.
84 See, for example, Rosemary O'Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the
Policies and Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41 Admin L
Rev 549 (1989); John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How
Overregulation Causes Underregulationat OSHA 7-16 (MIT, 1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Two Problems in Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L J 300, 308-13; Jerry L.
Mashaw and David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 Yale J Reg 257, 276-99 (1987); R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts
(Brookings, 1983).
85 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 475 (cited in note 1).
88 See Mashaw and Harfst, 4 Yale J Reg at 312-13 (cited in note 84); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims 7, 185-90 (Yale, 1983);
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration:Alternative Strategies for Public
Choice ConcerningFederally Aided Highway Construction,122 U Pa L Rev 1, 29-51 (1973).
8 See Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 475, 479-89 (cited in note 1). Actually, this result
would conflict with all of Sunstein's canons, since his system is premised on the assumption
that courts bear responsibility to counteract pathologies embedded in political institutions.
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This rhetorical question, however, helps to identify the inherent tension between canons (2)(e) and (2)(f). Judges who defer to
agency resolutions of factual and policy issues have no chance of
deterring agencies from engaging in factional decisionmaking.
Judges who review agency actions aggressively in an effort to deter
factional decisionmaking risk misunderstanding the facts, imposing
policies with no democratic legitimacy, and creating policy paralysis in the politically accountable branches. 8
3.

Canons based on regulatory pathology.

Sunstein's third category of proposed canons is the most interesting. He urges adoption of a series of canons designed to counteract "statutory failure." 89 The idea here is to identify the causes of
the failure of agency-administered statutory and regulatory
schemes and to interpret agency-administered statutes in a manner that will counteract any political or regulatory pathology that
threatens to detract from the proper performance of an agencyadministered government program. He describes several wellknown (and a few lesser-known) regulatory pathologies and proposes a canon to counteract each.
Thus, for instance, environmental statutes should be interpreted "aggressively" because collective action problems tend to
undermine implementation of environmental regulation by giving
advantages to concentrated, well-organized interests over diffuse,
poorly-organized interests.9 0 By contrast, occupational health and
safety statutes should be interpreted in a manner that imposes obstacles to aggressive regulation.9 1 Regulation of occupational health
and safety tends to be "overzealous" because collective action
problems have different effects in this type of regulatory regime.
The organized beneficiaries of regulation have advantages in the
regulatory process that enable them to obtain excessive regulation
in some contexts. According to Sunstein, the agency's realization
that it is driven to excessive regulation when it chooses to regulate
then induces the agency to refrain from any regulation in other
contexts.92
Without judicial review of agency actions, courts cannot perform this function.
88 See sources cited in note 84. See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions
of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 393 (1986).
,9 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 476-89 (cited in note 1).
90 Id at 478.
91 Id at 478-79.
82 Id at 489-91. Professor Mendeloff provides support for Sunstein's hypothesis that
agencies may react to the potential for excessive regulation by refraining from any regula-
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From this sophisticated analysis of problems that have arisen
in implementing regulatory statutes, Sunstein derives two canons:
environmental statutes should be interpreted aggressively, while
occupational health and safety statutes should be interpreted to
create obstacles to excessive regulation. Sunstein uses similar reasoning to support many other canons in this category: 9 (a) statutes
should be interpreted to allow the President to resolve "large"
questions of public policy, but also to require courts to resolve
questions of law; (b) statutes should be interpreted to favor beneficiaries where collective action problems are likely to handicap the
efforts of beneficiaries; (c) different statutes should be interpreted
to incorporate the same substantive standards; (d) statutes should
be interpreted to avoid "systemic" problems in regulation; (e) public law statutes should not be interpreted with reference to private
law principles; (f) statutes should be interpreted to avoid irrationality and injustice; (g) statutes benefiting disadvantaged groups
should be interpreted aggressively; (h) statutes that further
nonmarket values and aspirations should be interpreted aggressively; (i) statutes that embody interest group transfers should be
interpreted narrowly; (j) statutes should be interpreted to require
cost benefit analysis (but not by monetizing nonmarket values);
and (k) statutes should be interpreted to incorporate de minimis
exceptions.
Most of Sunstein's category (3) canons are firmly rooted in
empirical studies of regulatory pathology. The problem with these
canons is not a dearth but a plethora of regulatory pathologies.
The vast and growing literature on the etiology of regulatory failure identifies enough culprits to support dozens of additional category (3) canons. The canons so derived would instruct courts to
move in a wide variety of conflicting directions. There is, for instance, a rich empirical literature that implicates judicial review as
a major cause of regulatory failure.94 A canon premised on this regulatory pathology would displace all others: courts should interpret
statutes to preclude judicial review or to limit severely the scope of
judicial review.
tion. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 1-3 (cited in note 84). He
differs with Sunstein on the issue of the role of the courts in this process, however.
Mendeloff views aggressive judicial review of OSHA standards as a major source of the failure of this statutory system. Id at 8-14.
93 Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 476-89 (cited in note 1).
" See sources cited in notes 84 and 86.
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It is important to pause at this point to recall Sunstein's proposed allocation of institutional responsibility for interpretation of
agency-administered statutes and the extraordinary strength of his
proposed canons. Sunstein does not explain his assumption that
courts are institutionally superior to agencies as a source of statutory interpretations that counteract regulatory pathologies. Sunstein recognizes that agencies have significant comparative advantages over courts in their ability to gather facts and in the political
legitimacy of their policy decisions. 5 They would seem to have a
similar advantage over courts in identifying pathologies in the regulatory schemes they are charged with implementing and in adopting statutory interpretations that counteract those pathologies.
Presumably, Sunstein would respond: "foxes should not guard
hen houses."9' 6 If Sunstein means that agencies sometimes are
poorly motivated and are themselves the source of some regulatory
pathologies, he has won the point. It hardly follows, however, that
agencies usually are poorly motivated and usually are the source
of pathologies in the regulatory schemes they implement. Sometimes agencies are well motivated and interpret ambiguities in the
statutes they administer in order to counteract pathologies they
have identified in their daily efforts to implement a statutory regime.9 7 Sunstein's selection of courts as institutionally superior to
agencies in resolving ambiguities in the statutes they implement
must be premised on one of two beliefs: either agencies usually are
poorly motivated, or judges can distinguish with relative ease cases
and contexts in which agencies are poorly motivated versus cases
and contexts in which they are properly motivated. Moreover, he
must have great confidence in one of these two beliefs, because
they cause him to assign the dominant interpretive role to judges
notwithstanding his recognition of agency superiority in fact-finding and policymaking. Those who do not share either of Sunstein's
beliefs will continue to differ with him on the institutional issue.
Sunstein goes much further than to reject the institutional allocation of responsibility the Supreme Court announced in Chevron, however. He urges rejection of step one of Chevron: "First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
,5Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 475 (cited in note 1).
98 Id at 446, 470.
7 Moreover, Sunstein has proposed institutional mechanisms that would reduce the
probability that agencies will further factional interests. See Peter L. Strauss and Cass R.
Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin L Rev
181 (1986). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 Cal L
Rev 917, 934-37 (1985).
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precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.""8
As Sunstein's discussion of Public Citizen demonstrates,9 9 his herculean judges need not "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Rather, judicial interpretations are to
be governed by the canons he has designed to counteract political
and regulatory pathologies. Since many of these pathologies are
rooted in the legislative process, Sunstein's adoption of a neo-republican theory of government dictates this omnipotent role for
the judiciary. 10 0
With this background, the next step is to survey the features
of the world in which Sunstein's canons would govern judicial interpretation of statutes. Sunstein proposes more than a score of
canons designed to counteract an equal number of political and
regulatory pathologies. It would be easy to double the number of
canons by developing a new canon to counteract each of the welldocumented pathologies Sunstein neglects. If a judge were omniscient, she could identify multiple pathologies that infect any
agency-administered statutory scheme. Each provision of a statute
is a product of multiple forces, usually including one or more
pathologies. 10 1 Different features of the same statutory scheme are
the product of different combinations of pathologies. Moreover,
the same agency-administered statute can be infected by different
pathologies at different times because of changes in the political
environment in which the agency functions. Thus, even an omniscient judge with no ideological bias would be forced to choose
which of several conflicting canons should control any interpretive
dispute. Of course, judges are neither omniscient nor free of ideological bias. Generally, they are bright and well-motivated, but
they are mere mortals. They are also very busy mortals. 10 2 Their
caseload precludes them from engaging in extensive research to determine the combination of political pathologies that gave rise to a
particular statutory provision or the regulatory pathologies that
are likely to arise from time to time in agency attempts to imple98 467 US at 842-43.
19 See text at notes 51-58.
100 See Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1544-47 (cited in note 6).
101 See Section II.E.3.
102 For instance, the average federal circuit judge participates in 382 cases annually.
Federal Courts Study Committee, Tentative Recommendations for Public Comment 100
(1989).
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ment statutes with alternative interpretations. 1 8 Indeed, most
judges have little understanding of what agencies do, of the resources they have available to perform their many responsibilities,
or of the managerial and decision processes that are likely to permit them to perform
their assigned tasks with the limited re04
sources available.1

Sunstein would assign this task to hundreds of judges with
widely varying ideological biases. Different judges are likely to
reach different diagnoses based on the always ambiguous symptoms of political and regulatory pathology. The likelihood of diagnostic consensus, agreement on applicable canons, agreement in
resolving intercanon conflicts, and consistency in resulting statutory interpretation is remote.
Moreover, as Peter Strauss has demonstrated, the Supreme
Court's task of maintaining consistency in statutory interpretation
grows more difficult every day. 05 With every other component of
the judicial system growing rapidly, the Court's inherent limit of
150 cases per year imposes severe constraints on its ability to
maintain intercircuit consistency. Even intracircuit consistency is
suffering significantly from the growth in the sprawling federal judiciary and from the increasing range of ideological perspectives
that are now well-represented in all circuits. 06 Strauss's prescription-greater deference to agency interpretations of statutes' 0 7 -is
the opposite of Sunstein's.
E. Judicial Approaches to Sunstein's Canons
Judges might interpret and apply Sunstein's canons in any of
three ways. First, they might attempt a particularized canonical
approach, identifying which canons apply to a specific interpretive
103 For a rich description of the enormous increase in the workload of federal judges
and the many ways judges have been forced to adapt to this change, see Richard A. Posner,
The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 59-130 (Harvard, 1985).
101 It seems unlikely, for instance, that the judges who imposed statewide decision
deadlines on Social Security disability decisionmaking knew that they were requiring Administrative Law Judges to hear forty cases per day. See Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice at
188 (cited in note 86). It seems similarly unlikely that the judges who have engaged in aggressive review of some EPA programs knew that they were requiring the agency to abandon
or to defer other programs that both EPA and Congress considered more important. See
O'Leary, 41 Admin L Rev at 561-62 (cited in note 84).
10" Strauss, 87 Colum L Rev at 1093, 1105-16 (cited in note 31).
10 See Pierce, 1988 Duke L J at 303-07 (cited in note 84); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public
Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the JudiciaryAttempt to Police the PoliticalInstitutions?, 77 Georgetown L J 2031, 2036-40, 2044 (1989).
107 Strauss, 87 Colum L Rev at 1118-26 (cited in note 31).
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dispute and resolving any conflicts among arguably relevant
canons. Second, judges might take a broader approach, viewing
Sunstein's particularized canons as a nonexhaustive list of potential ways of characterizing and counteracting the many forms of
political and regulatory failure. Sunstein's detailed instructions
could then be reduced to a single broad canon-interpret statutes
in a manner that will improve the performance of the regulatory
system. Third, judges could adopt a broad approach that emphasizes the source of most political and regulatory pathologies-the
potential for factionalism. As so interpreted, Sunstein's detailed
instructions could be reduced to another broad canon-interpret
statutes to minimize the effects of factionalism. In the next three
sections, we attempt to show why none of these alternative methods of implementing Sunstein's canons offers a realistic prospect
for acceptable results.
1.

Sunstein's canons as detailed instructions.

The indeterminacy of the particularized version of Sunstein's
approach can be seen by considering one of the examples he selects
to illustrate his approach. Sunstein applauds the interpretation of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act adopted by a plurality of
Justices in Benzene. 105 Requiring the agency to find a "significant
risk" to workers as a result of exposure to preexisting levels of a
toxic substance before the agency can reduce exposure levels
avoids the regulatory pathology of overzealous regulation. To Sunstein, the Court rescued society from an agency bent on imposing
"enormous costs in exchange for small or speculative gains." 10 9
There are two large problems with Sunstein's description of
the proper judicial role in Benzene, however. First, his account is
counterfactual. On remand, the Reagan Administration's OSHAan agency never accused of "overzealous regulation"-reimposed
the standard previously rejected by the Supreme Court.11 0 One of
the many studies in the voluminous record concluded that the
standard would avoid between 44 and 152 unnecessary deaths per
1,000 workers"'-gains that are necessarily "speculative" but not
"small." The Supreme Court's synoptic demand for greater cer108
Sunstein,

103 Harv L Rev at 489-92 (cited in note 1).

109 Id at 489.

110 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Occupational Exposure to Benzene,
52 Fed Reg 34460 (1987).
" See Jerry L. Mashaw and Richard A. Merrill, Administrative Law: The American
Public Law System 101 (West, Supp 1989).
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tainty concerning the need for a regulation may have created a
common regulatory pathology-seven years of delay in implementing a rule that will save hundreds of lives.
Second, many judges charged with responsibility to interpret
OSHA through application of Sunstein's canons would apply different canons with dramatically different results. Indeed, using
Sunstein's approach, it would be easy to "interpret" the statute
not to require a finding of "significant risk" even if Congress had
explicitly incorporated such a requirement in the Act. A judge
could support such an interpretation through application of any
combination of at least four of Sunstein's proposed canons: (1)
statutes should be interpreted to favor beneficiaries where collective action problems are likely to handicap the efforts of beneficiaries; (2) statutes should be interpreted to avoid "systemic"
problems in regulation; (3) statutes benefiting disadvantaged
groups should be interpreted aggressively; and (4) statutes that
further nonmarket values and aspirations should be interpreted
aggressively. It is at least arguable that: (1) employees suffer from
collective action problems relative to employers; (2) a requirement
that an agency establish a clear need for each health-based rule
before it imposes the rule will lead to systemic underregulation; (3)
workers are members of a disadvantaged group; and (4) requiring
employers to provide a work environment free of toxic substances
will further nonmarket values and aspirations. Those same canons
could support a judicial interpretation of the Food and Drug Act
that establishes an absolute prohibition on carcinogenic color additives even if Congress repealed the Delaney Clause.
We are not suggesting that all judges would apply Sunstein's
canons to OSHA and FDA in a manner that yields statutory interpretations the opposite of Sunstein's. We suspect that about half
would agree with Sunstein's canonical results and about half would
reach the opposite conclusion. That is our point. The interpretive
approach he urges is hopelessly indeterminate.
The interpretive issues Sunstein selects to illustrate application of his canons are not unusual in this respect. Indeed, the complexity of the process of canonical interpretation and the indeterminacy of the results of that process increase considerably upon
examination of other interpretive disputes. Each of the following
examples, drawn from the vast universe of ambiguous regulatory
statutes, introduces an additional set of problems that would vex
judges charged with responsibility to apply Sunstein's canons.
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Section 111 of the Clean Air Act required the EPA to establish
rules governing emissions of sulfur oxides from utility boilers.112
Both the language of the Act and its legislative history were ambiguous with respect to an important policy question: must utilities
install expensive scrubbers on all units, or can they use a combination of low sulfur coal and less expensive control technologies? 1 3
Congress was so sharply divided on this issue that it chose intentionally ambiguous statutory language. The alternative to intentional ambiguity-deliberation to resolve the policy dispute-posed the risk of a stalemate, jeopardizing passage of the
entire Act. 1 4
Once Congress declined to resolve this major policy dispute
through use of unambiguous statutory language, some other institution-an agency or court-had to make the policy decision
through the process of statutory interpretation. At this point, Sunstein would charge a judge with the responsibility of interpreting
the statute in accordance with his proposed canons. Canon (3)(b)
immediately comes to mind. Environmental statutes should be interpreted "aggressively" because their beneficiaries suffer from collective action problems. Because all environmental organizations
favored a requirement of universal scrubbing, a judge should interpret § 111 to incorporate such a requirement through application
of canon (3)(b).
With more thought and research, however, the judge might
find the canonical interpretation exercise more difficult. As Ackerman and Hassler have documented, the owners of high sulfur coal
were the principal proponents of a universal scrubbing requirement." 5 They viewed such a requirement as a means of enhancing
their wealth by placing low sulfur coal at an economic disadvantage. Thus, the interpretive dispute arguably is governed by canon
(3)(i): statutes that embody interest group transfers should be interpreted narrowly. Section 111 should not be interpreted to require universal scrubbing because universal scrubbing would effect
a regulatory transfer of wealth to a narrow interest group. Since,
however, canon (3)(b) outranks canon (3)(i), perhaps universal
scrubbing should be required.
A little more thought and research will raise further questions
about this result. Ackerman and Hassler purport to demonstrate
...Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7411 (1982 & Supp 1988).
1"3Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 48-54 (Yale,

1981).
21

Id at 54.

125 Id at 31.
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that universal scrubbing is the "costliest possible clean air solution," 11 6 and that imposing a universal scrubbing requirement has
the potential to harm air quality. 11 7 This additional data suggests
the applicability of canons (3)(f) and (3)(j): statutes should be interpreted to require cost-benefit analysis, and statutes should be
interpreted to avoid irrationality. Thus, the judge needs to determine whether the combination of canons (3)(f), (3)(i), and (3)(j)
counterbalances canon (3)(b). Sunstein proposes no mechanism to
accomplish this task.
The puzzle would not be complete, however, without considering another potential canonical outcome. Canon (2)(e) (courts
should defer to agency understandings of law and policy) and the
first half of canon (3)(a) (statutes should be interpreted to allow
the President to resolve "large" questions of policy) suggest that
the judge should eschew any independent attempt to interpret
§ 111, affirming any reasonable interpretation the agency adopts.
This result is inconsistent, however, with the second half of canon
(3)(a), directing that statutes should be interpreted to require
courts to resolve questions of law. By distinguishing sharply between questions of law and questions of policy in canon (3)(a),
Sunstein seems not to recognize that many questions can be characterized as either or both. 1 8 Thus, to solve the puzzle of § 111, a
judge must decide which of three combinations of canons should
control: (3)(a) (second half) and (3)(b) suggest one result (aggressive interpretation); (3)(a) (second half), (3)(f), (3)(i) and (3)(j)
suggest another (narrow interpretation); while (2)(e) and (3)(a)
(first half) suggest a third (defer to agency interpretation).
Congress has created a new version of this puzzle in the process of enacting this year's amendments to the Clean Air Act. The
amendments proposed by President Bush would have required
U.S. automakers to manufacture a large fleet of experimental vehicles designed to burn methane, methanol, or ethanol in lieu of gasoline." Congress was sharply divided on this issue. 1 20 The result
116Id.
117Id at 2, 78, 88. Ackerman and Hassler urge a canon the opposite of Sunstein's environmental canon: "In a nutshell, courts should not be quick to read the more aggressive
forms of agency-forcing into ambiguous statutory language." Id at 106.
118See Pierce, 41 Vand L Rev at 304-05 (cited in note 9).
119See Gretchen Morgenson and Gale Eisenstodt, "Profits Are for Rape and Pillage,"

Forbes 94, 96 (Mar 5, 1990); Robert W. Hahn, Last Gasp for Bush Clean Air Reforms, Wall
St J A24 (Nov 7, 1989); Remarks at the Ceremony Transmitting to the Congress the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1989, 25 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1135, 1136 (July 21, 1989).
120 See Sara Hansard, Hill Compromise on Clean Air Receives Gas Industry Support,
Natural Gas Week 1, 6-7 (Mar 5, 1990).
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was another series of intentionally ambiguous provisions that may
or may not be interpreted to require manufacture of such a fleet.121
The putative (and plausible) rationale for such a statutory mandate is to improve air quality. 12 2 Environmental groups were not
the only proponents of the measure, however. Agribusiness and the
natural gas industry placed their considerable financial and political power behind this initiative because they expect it to enhance
their wealth.1 23 Its prospects for passage, even in an ambiguous
form, would have been slight without this special interest group
support. Should a judge characterize a fleet of alternative fuel powered vehicles as an environmental protection measure or as an interest group transfer? A judge could write a well-reasoned opinion
supporting either characterization and, hence, adopting either a
narrow or an aggressive interpretation of the ambiguous statutory
provisions through application of Sunstein's canons.
These two examples illustrate a general phenomenon that
would bedevil any attempt to rely on Sunstein's canons. Most important provisions of regulatory statutes emerge from the process
of statutory enactment because some people perceive them as serving the public good (for example, air quality) while other people
perceive them as a source of private wealth. It is exceedingly difficult to enact a provision that is perceived as only one or the other.
In most cases, both perceptions are entirely plausible: virtually all
regulatory actions transfer wealth; many also serve a public good.
A method of statutory interpretation that depends on the ability of
a judge to characterize a statutory provision as either solving a collective action problem or as transferring wealth to a special interest group is premised on a dichotomy that rarely exists. To the
extent that it does exist, judges have limited ability to distinguish
121 The seven-hundred-page Clean Air Amendments of 1990 contain many provisions
that may have the effect of mandating manufacture of a fleet of vehicles designed to burn
alternative fuels; for example, four different standards applicable to auto tailpipes at different times and in different locations, plus special provisions applicable to fleet vehicles.
12' The tradeoffs among ethanol, methane, and reconstituted gasoline are complicated
and poorly understood. Ethanol would reduce carbon monoxide emissions, but would increase aldehyde and nitrogen oxide emissions, increase use of fertilizer and pesticides, increase transportation costs, and increase food costs. Methane would reduce carbon monoxide emissions and ozone formation, but even small increases in leakage of raw methane into
the atmosphere could exacerbate the greenhouse effect, since methane's insulating effect is
twenty-five times as great as that of carbon dioxide.
123 For discussion of gas industry efforts, see Natural Gas Industry Urges Ambitious
Alternative Fuels Program, 124 Pub Util Fort 57 (Nov 23, 1989). For illustrations of
agribusiness efforts, see Michael J. Weiss, The High-OctaneEthanol Lobby, NY Times Mag
Part 2 at 18 (Apr 1, 1990). See also Rose Gutfeld, For Each Dollar Spent on Clean Air
Someone Stands to Make a Buck, Wall St J Al (Oct 29, 1990).
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between transfers of wealth disguised as solutions to collective action problems and solutions to collective action problems that incidentally transfer wealth.12
2. Sunstein's canons as a general instruction to improve the
performance of a regulatory system.
The current controversy over the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (FERC) power to order "wheeling" of electricity illustrates the difficulty of applying Sunstein's canons as a single
broad instruction to interpret statutes in a manner that will improve the performance of a regulatory system. 125 "Wheeling" refers

to the transmission of electricity for third parties. For the past
fifty years, utilities have adamantly opposed any effort by the government to compel them to provide wheeling service. Until recent
years, FERC had taken the position that it lacks the power to order wheeling. 126 In the last few years, however, FERC has begun to
assert that power in a growing number of contexts.1 2 7 It is now con-

sidering imposition of a general obligation to provide equal access
8
12
to transmission lines.

The statute that governs FERC's power to order equal access
to transmission is ambiguous and internally inconsistent. 29 The
Federal Power Act "fairly bristles" with concern about undue discrimination in the provision of transmission service.130 FERC could
defend mandatory wheeling as an essential remedy to alleviate
124 See Pierce, 36 Am U L Rev at 396-98 (cited in note 9).
115 See, for example, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, The Transmission Task
Force's Report to the Commission (1989); Ashley C. Brown, Breaking the Transmission
Logjam, 1 Elec J 14 (1988); Joe D. Pace, Wheeling and the Obligation to Serve, 8 Energy L
J 265 (1987); William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to
the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 Energy L J 337 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal
to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 Va L Rev 1183 (1986).
See, for example, City of Paris v Kentucky Utilities Co., 41 FPC 45 (1969).
,2 See, for example, Utah Power & Light Co., 45 FERC 1 61,095 (1988) (utilities not
allowed to merge unless they agree to wheel power for others).
128 See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Regulations Governing Bidding Programs, 53 Fed Reg 9324 (1988) (proposed rule that would allow utilities to conduct auctions
or to participate in auctions for new wholesale power supplies only if they agree to wheel for
others).
There are actually two ambiguous and internally inconsistent statutes relevant to
this issue: The Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 USC §§ 791-825u (1988), and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 92 Stat 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of
Title 16).
130 See Associated Gas Distributors v FERC, 824 F2d 981, 998 (DC Cir 1987); see also
FPC v Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 US 348, 353 (1956) (Natural Gas Act and Federal
Power Act are to be interpreted to mean the same thing, since one was patterned after the
other and both were intended to respond to same set of problems).
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statutorily prohibited undue discrimination.""1 Yet, the legislative
history of the Act indicates that Congress explicitly declined to
give FERC the power to make electric utilities common carriers 1.-3 a power functionally similar to the power to mandate
wheeling.
In broad terms, Sunstein's canons would instruct a judge to
resolve this dispute by adopting the statutory interpretation that
will improve the performance of the regulatory system. To make
such a determination, however, a judge must make assumptions
about the resolution of at least one other major interpretive dispute: whether FERC must continue to base wholesale electricity
prices on embedded accounting costs or whether FERC can allow
those prices to be established through a process of competitive
contracting."'3 The availability of mandatory wheeling would allow
distributors and large consumers to choose among competing
wholesale suppliers of electricity based on price. If wholesale prices
are based on marginal cost (as they would tend to be in a competitive contracting process), giving distributors and consumers a
choice among wholesale suppliers offers the prospect of an improved regulatory system.' 3 Distributors and consumers would be
encouraged to purchase electricity from sources that use the least
amount of society's scarce resources. Permitting distributors to
choose among competing suppliers based on price would not improve the performance of the regulatory system, however, if wholesale prices continued to be based on embedded accounting costs.
Such a distorted pricing system frequently would encourage consumers and distributors to purchase electricity from old high-resource-cost sources instead of from new low-resource-cost
sources. 3 5 Moreover, mandatory wheeling combined with embed131 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Using the Gas Industry As A Guide to Reconstituting
the Electricity Industry, - J Res in L & Econ - (forthcoming 1990) (arguing by analogy
from Associated Gas Distributors,824 F2d at 998-1001, and Maryland People's Counsel v
FERC, 761 F2d 768 (DC Cir 1985)).
132 See Associated Gas Distributors,824 F2d at 998.
133 To get a flavor of the difficulty of this interpretive issue, see Farmers Union Central
Exchange, Inc. v FERC, 734 F2d 1486 (DC Cir 1984); Consumers Union v Sawhill, 512 F2d
1112 (Temp Emer Ct App 1975); FPC v Texaco, Inc., 417 US 380 (1974). See also John
Wyeth Griggs, Competitive Bidding and Independent Power Producers:Is Deregulation
Coming to the Electric Utility Industry?, 9 Energy L J 415 (1988); Leonard L. Coburn, Oil
Pipeline Regulation:Has the FERC Finally Slain the Minotaur?,6 Energy L J 209 (1985);
Leonard L. Coburn, Farmers Union II: Sisyphus Starts Up the Hill Again, 5 Energy L J
309 (1984).
13 See Pierce, 72 Va L Rev at 1214, 1215 (cited in note 125); Kevin Kelly and J. Stephen Henderson, Some Economic Principlesfor Pricing Wheeled Power (NRRI, 1987).
"I See Tye, 8 Energy L J at 370-74 (cited in note 125); Pace, 8 Energy L J at 278-79
(cited in note 125).
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ded cost pricing looks suspiciously like a pure transfer of wealth to
special interest groups.'3 6
The mandatory wheeling example illustrates two significant
problems with reading Sunstein's proposal as an instruction to
judges to interpret statutes in a manner that will improve the performance of a regulatory system. First, a judge must learn a great
deal about the operation of a particular regulatory system before
she can implement such a canon with confidence. Most generalist
judges are far too busy to take this essential step. Second, such
statutory interpretation frequently is contingent on the other policies the agency adopts to implement the regulatory system. This
problem of interrelationship could be solved in theory if one judge
reviewed all agency policy decisions, many of which reach the
courts characterized as issues of statutory interpretation. That single judge could then implement Sunstein's canon by selecting the
combination of statutory interpretations that the judge expects to
improve the performance of a regulatory system. 3
This theoretical possibility is inconsistent with the institutional characteristics of the judiciary, however, in at least three
ways. First, different judges are likely to be required to address
functionally related interpretive issues.318 One judge might, for instance, apply Sunstein's "improve the performance of the regulatory system" canon by interpreting FERC's statutes to confer on it
authority to require mandatory wheeling, on the assumption that
FERC can and will allow wholesale prices to be determined
through a process of competitive contracting. Another judge might
apply the same canon to yield an interpretation of FERC's statutes
that requires it to base wholesale prices on embedded accounting
costs, on the assumption that FERC lacks the power (or will not
exercise the power) to order mandatory wheeling. Each interpretation might be correct based on each judge's plausible assumptions,
but they are obviously incompatible.'3 9 The combination would impair significantly the performance of the regulatory system because
the interpretations are premised on inconsistent regulatory models.
136 Tye, 8 Energy L J at 368-74 (cited in note 125).

137 For an example of this approach, albeit in a dissenting opinion, see Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc. v FERC, 885 F2d 209, 226 (5th Cir 1989) (Brown

dissenting on basis that combination of policies agency implemented made sense once relationship among policies was understood), cert granted, 110 S Ct 2585 (1990).
133 Compare Associated Gas Distributors,824 F2d 981 (affirming cluster of FERC pol-

icy initiatives), with Mobil Oil, 885 F2d 209 (reversing cluster of FERC policy issues closely
related to those affirmed in Associated Gas Distributors).

139 See Tye, 8 Energy L J at 337 (cited in note 125); Pace, 8 Energy L J at 265 (cited in
note 125).
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Second, most judges are too busy to educate themselves to the
extent necessary to recognize the critical functional relationship
among interpretive disputes. The judiciary as a whole is likely to
blunder into one of two incompatible sets of interpretations, that
is, mandatory wheeling combined with prices based on embedded
accounting costs, or no power to impose mandatory wheeling combined with prices based on competitive contracting.
Third, given judges' limited ability to educate themselves concerning the effects of alternative statutory interpretations, and the
contestable nature of the effects we have described, each judge is
likely to rely on her own general beliefs as her principal basis for
applying Sunstein's canons. A judge who is skeptical of the efficacy
of market forces is likely to believe that the regulatory system will
perform best if FERC bases wholesale prices on embedded accounting costs and does not have the power to create competition
among utilities by mandating wheeling. A judge who is skeptical of
the efficacy of government regulation is likely to have the opposite
set of beliefs. 4 0 If each of these two hypothetical judges resolves
one of the two interpretive disputes through application of Sunstein's "improve the performance of the regulatory system" canon,
the agency will be saddled with a combination of incompatible regulatory policies.
The likelihood of this result is considerably greater than this
simple example suggests. In order to implement any regulatory
scheme effectively, an agency must make a dozen or more policy
decisions, many through the process of interpreting ambiguous
statutory provisions.141 In most contexts, there is more than one
combination of policies (statutory interpretations) that offers a realistic prospect of effective regulation. Many of the hundreds of
140Compare, for instance, the majority and dissenting opinions in Associated Gas Dis-

tributors,824 F2d at 1001, 1018, 1028 (majority expresses confidence in market forces); id at
1044 (Mikva dissenting expresses skepticism), and Mobil Oil, 885 F2d at 216, 219-20, 224
(majority reverses initiatives designed to create competitive market); id at 226-28 (Brown
dissenting expresses confidence in market forces).
141 Consider, for instance, the large number of functionally related policy and interpretive issues FERC has resolved and courts have reviewed over the last five years in FERC's
efforts to regulate the natural gas industry. See Associated Gas Distributorsv FERC, 893
F2d 349 (DC Cir 1989); American Gas Ass'n v FERC, 888 F2d 136 (DC Cir 1989); Mobil Oil,
885 F2d 209; Kaiser-FrancisOil Co. v Producer's Gas Co., 870 F2d 563 (10th Cir 1989);
National Steel Corp. v Long, 689 F Supp 729 (W D Mich 1988); Office of Consumers' Counsel v FERC, 826 F2d 1136 (DC Cir 1987); Associated Gas Distributors,824 F2d 981; Consolidated Edison Co. v FERC, 823 F2d 630 (DC Cir 1987); Wisconsin Gas Co. v FERC, 770 F2d
1144 (DC Cir 1985).
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possible combinations will not work, however, not because any individual interpretation is "wrong," but because the combination of
interpretations is based on incompatible policies. With the entire
federal judiciary potentially involved in the process of judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, and with those judges' beliefs covering a wide ideological spectrum from extreme skepticism
of market forces to extreme skepticism of government intervention, the probability is high that an agency will be handicapped by
some combination of incompatible statutory interpretations im14
posed by well-intentioned judges of differing ideologies. 1
3. Sunstein's canons as a general instruction to minimize the
effects of factionalism.
Like most of the innovative proposals that pour from the pen
of this prolific scholar, Sunstein's canons are designed to counteract the tendency of political institutions to reflect majoritarian and
minoritarian factionalism. 143 The enterprise is worthy of serious
scholarly attention. Madison's predictions of factionalism in democratic institutions14 4 have proven accurate, and the Framers' structural checks have not completely avoided the effects of factionalism in the administrative state.14 5 Some of the many legal
doctrines Sunstein proposes in his effort to reduce factionalism offer considerable promise. 46 His canons do not, however, in part
because the phenomenon of factionalism is more complicated than
Sunstein assumes.
For courts to counteract factionalism in the administrative
state through the process of statutory interpretation, they must be
able to identify a form of factionalism that manifests itself on a
reasonably consistent basis in implementing a particular regulatory
regime. Typically, the statutory interpretation that counteracts mi142 Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d 584, 593-94
(DC Cir 1971) (EPA cannot defer decision to suspend pesticide registration pending further
investigation once it becomes aware of serious health hazard), with Love v Thomas, 858 F2d
1347, 1357-63 (9th Cir 1988) (EPA cannot exercise suspension power until it has investigated effects of suspension, even when it knows of serious health hazard). See also Pierce, 64
NYU L Rev at 1252-54 (cited in note 9).
143SSee Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1539, 1560-61, 1587-89 (cited in note 6). See also Cass
R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum L Rev 1689, 1710-32

(1984).
"'

Federalist 10 (Madison) in Cooke, ed, The Federalist at 56 (cited in note 60).

145 See Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 475-77 (cited in note 1); Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at

1556, 1560-61, 1587-89 (cited in note 6).
14' See, for example, Strauss and Sunstein, 38 Admin L Rev at 188-94 (cited in note
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noritarian factionalism is the converse of the interpretation that
counteracts majoritarian factionalism. In many contexts, however,
either form of factionalism can arise, depending on the political
environment in which an agency is operating.147 That political environment can change dramatically from period to period, suggesting the need for different statutory interpretations in different
time periods.
This phenomenon of factional cycling can be illustrated with
reference to the regulation of electric utilities. Paul Joskow has
shown empirically that electric utility regulation was characterized
by minoritarian factionalism during the 1950s and most of the
1960s. 14 8 The combination of declining costs, a technically intricate
regulatory process, information asymmetries, and collective action
problems conferred on utilities the power to obtain regulatory results systematically advantageous to them and disadvantageous to
consumers.
One of the authors has demonstrated empirically that electric
utility regulation has been characterized by majoritarian factionalism during the 1980s.14 9 Increasing costs and easily communicated
symbols of utility greed inflamed public passions, activated previously dormant consumer groups, and pressured regulators to behave opportunistically by reallocating billions of dollars of wealth
from utilities to consumers.
The potential for factional cycling exists in many other contexts.e ° This suggests another set of problems for judges called
upon to interpret regulatory statutes in a manner calculated to
counteract factionalism. Judges will have to adopt different interpretations of the same statutory provisions in different periods of
time, depending on whether the political and regulatory environment of the moment is spawning majoritarian factionalism or minoritarian factionalism. This, in turn, suggests the need for judges
to engage in careful empirical research concerning the effects of an
agency's actions in differing political environments. It does not
seem realistic, however, to expect overworked generalist judges to
undertake extensive empirical research when reviewing an agency
interpretation of a regulatory statute. Indeed, judges lack the time
and resources required even to conduct a thorough search of the
"I' See Komesar, 86 Mich L Rev at 671-83 (cited in note 33).
148

Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the

Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J L & Econ 291, 305-11 (1974).
119 Pierce, 77 Georgetown L J at 2048-53 (cited in note 106).
'50 Id at 2075-77.
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secondary literature and to read that literature carefully and critically before adopting a particular statutory interpretation designed
to counteract factionalism. Given judges' limited ability to identify
factional cycles through careful empirical research, they are likely
to base statutory interpretations on the propaganda of the thendominant faction, thereby reinforcing the power of that faction."
In sum, Sunstein's instructions to judges called upon to interpret agency-administered statutes would read something like this:
You should defer to agency interpretations unless you believe that
they are the product of a political pathology or will lead to a regulatory pathology. You should interpret statutes in a manner consistent with congressional intent unless you believe that Congress's
intent was a product of a political pathology or will yield a regulatory pathology. Whenever you identify a political or regulatory pathology, your responsibility is to interpret the statute to avoid or
counteract that pathology even if such an interpretation is inconsistent both with the agency's interpretation and with your determination of congressional intent. You should refer to the vast literature in political science, political economics, and public law to
identify political and regulatory pathologies. I have given you a
head start in mastering that literature by identifying about twenty
pathologies that should guide you as you embark on this herculean
adventure.
Giving an instruction of this nature to the 800 mere mortals
that constitute the federal judiciary is a prescription for cacophony
in the administrative state. Any method of interpretation,
whatever else it accomplishes, must be consistent with the institutional characteristics of the interpretive community, the judiciary.
Sunstein's bold proposal fails that threshold test.

251 See, for example, Barasch v Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 516 Pa 142, 532
A2d 325 (1987), aff'd as Duquesne Light Co. v Barasch, 109 S Ct 609 (1989) (interpreting
newly enacted ambiguous state statute to require state utility commission to disallow recovery of all investments in canceled power plants).

